The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Where Do We Go From Here? by Cabranes, José A.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 44 




The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Where Do We Go From Here? 
José A. Cabranes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
José A. Cabranes, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Where Do We Go From Here?, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 
(2000). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol44/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
271 
THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
JOSÉ A. CABRANES* 
The question today is not whether the federal system of Guidelines 
Sentencing is better or worse than the system of unguided discretion that it 
replaced.  There is well-nigh universal agreement that the general outlines of 
the current system are here to stay.  All of us have acknowledged that Congress 
is not likely in the near future to repeal those portions of the Sentencing 
Reform Act that mandated the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  
The Guidelines have become deeply entrenched.  More than half of active 
federal judges have been appointed since the Guidelines became effective in 
November of 1987.  Few federal probation officers, and fewer Assistant United 
States Attorneys, have labored under any other regime of federal sentencing.  
Moreover, completely abolishing the Sentencing Guidelines would involve 
repealing not only most of the Sentencing Reform Act, but numerous other 
statutory provisions; over twenty criminal statutes enacted in the last decade 
explicitly refer to the Sentencing Guidelines, generally by instructing the 
Commission to provide a sentence “enhancement” for certain offenders. 
In light of the entrenchment of the Guidelines, we should have no illusion 
that they will be easily discarded or supplanted in the near future.  The 
question, therefore, is whether the present system should be modified or 
reformed to achieve greater coherence, consistency, accountability, and, 
ultimately, a higher level of justice.  At stake here is the very legitimacy of our 
system of criminal justice. 
I propose three reforms that could be undertaken without amendment of 
the Sentencing Reform Act or other congressional action—that is, by exercise 
of the authority of the Sentencing Commission or of the Advisory Committee 
on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  These three reforms would, I 
believe, at least ameliorate certain of the Guidelines’ most troubling 
shortcomings.  I hope that these proposals will be entertained by a range of 
policy-makers with widely divergent views of the Guidelines as a whole. 
 
* United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit (1994-); United States District Judge for the 
District of Connecticut (1979-1994; Chief Judge, 1992-1994); Author, with Kate Stith, of FEAR 
OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998), from which he draws 
here.  This is a lightly revised version of concluding remarks delivered at the Conference on 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
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Apart from a general plea for simplification of the structure and text of the 
Guidelines, I have only one recommendation relating to the substance of the 
Guidelines; the two others basically accept the substance and try to make the 
procedures fairer, more coherent, and more workable. 
I. TREAT SOME “REAL OFFENSE” FACTORS AS BASES FOR “GUIDED” 
DEPARTURES 
My substantive recommendation is that the Commission should treat some 
“real offense” factors not as bases for mandatory adjustment of the sentencing 
range, but as bases for “guided departures”—that is, departures guided by the 
Commission’s advice. 
Reducing reliance on precise and complex mandatory sentencing 
instructions, and making greater use of guided departures instead, would 
fortify the moral dimension of sentencing, would reduce the robotics of 
judging under the Guidelines, would increase the comprehensibility of the 
Guidelines—thereby enhancing their legitimacy in the eyes of the public—and 
would respond to due process concerns, about which more anon. 
Much of the complexity and seeming arbitrariness of the present 
Guidelines is a result of the attempt to specify the exact degree of each 
sentencing factor that warrants an additional one-point adjustment in Offense 
Level or criminal history score.  What I suggest instead is that the Commission 
identify each factor warranting an adjustment and then allow the sentencing 
judge a range within which he or she would determine the appropriate value of 
the adjustment in the case at hand.  The Commission could make the range 
large or small. 
Making greater use of guided departures may be especially appropriate 
with respect to “real offense” (that is, non-statutory) factors that, as the 
Guidelines are currently written, always greatly affect the defendant’s final 
sentencing range—in particular, “special offense characteristics” involving 
only quantity of harm, the principle of “relevant conduct,” and the weight 
accorded to criminal history. 
These are the areas where the lack of countervailing judicial authority is 
most troubling, both in terms of checks and balances on prosecutorial power 
and in terms of due process for the defendant.  More generally, the 
Commission might provide guidance to judges, encouraging departures within 
some range where the judge is able to demonstrate that a particular adjustment 
required by the Guidelines is either too large or too small in relation to 
individual culpability.  Of course, all departures (“guided” by the Commission 
or otherwise) would have to be explained by the sentencing judge and would 
continue to be reviewed by the appellate courts under the statutory standard of 
“reasonable[ness].” 
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II. ENHANCE THE PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS AT SENTENCING 
As for procedural aspects of the Guidelines, I propose that the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, the administrative governing board of the 
federal courts, reassess the procedural protections that are available, or should 
be available, at sentencing. 
This assessment could be carried out by the Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or perhaps by a committee appointed for 
this purpose.  Whatever committee undertakes this study should reexamine 
both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Guideline Manual’s 
Chapter Six policy statements on sentencing procedures.  As matters now 
stand, some of the rules governing sentencing hearings are spelled out in the 
Guidelines Manual, while others are stated in the Criminal Rules. 
To its credit, the Sentencing Commission devoted substantial attention to 
the procedural aspects of sentencing even before these issues were taken up in 
the Federal Rules.  The “Policy Statements” in Chapter Six recognize that fact-
finding under a mandatory sentencing regime is of critical importance.  They 
instruct judges to permit both parties “an adequate opportunity” to dispute any 
factors relevant to sentencing under the Guidelines, and they encourage 
“reliable” fact-finding (albeit under a “preponderance” standard). 
In 1993, moreover, the Commission added to its “Commentary” on plea 
agreements a paragraph that “encourages” prosecutors to disclose to the 
defendant prior to any plea of guilty those “facts and circumstances . . . that are 
relevant to the application” of the Guidelines.  This 1993 amendment 
implicitly acknowledges the unfairness of having a defendant plead guilty 
before he is advised of the punishment that the mandatory system of 
sentencing has in store for him. 
Until now, however, the Commission has not been prepared to go very far 
in prescribing adjudicatory procedures at sentencing, despite its recognition of 
the fully adjudicatory nature of the Guidelines sentencing process.  Moreover, 
the Commission’s Policy Statements have not set forth a realistic or workable 
approach to fact-finding by probation officers and to plea agreements.  The 
dominant concern of the Sentencing Commission in Chapter Six of the 
Guidelines Manual has been to discourage evasion of the Guidelines by the 
parties and the judge. 
That, of course, is a perfectly reasonable concern of the Commission.  But 
it is by no means clear that the Sentencing Commission is the most appropriate 
place to address issues of sentencing procedure.  To be sure, the Commission is 
authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act to promulgate “Policy Statements” 
on procedures for implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Some case-
law, however, suggests that these policies may not actually be binding on 
federal judges in the way that formal Guidelines are.  In any event, I have 
never heard anyone argue that Sentencing Commission “Policy Statements” 
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should or would prevail over conflicting provisions adopted in the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Let me suggest that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are the most 
appropriate forum (indeed, the obvious forum) in which to address matters of 
sentencing procedure.  The process provided in the Rules Enabling Act is far 
more open and thorough than the process provided in the Sentencing Reform 
Act.  The Sentencing Commission issues a variety of proposed Guidelines 
amendments for public comment (and sometimes holds public hearings), then 
issues those it desires as final amendments.  Thereafter, it awaits the 180-day 
period during which Congress may review the amendments.  There have been 
few congressional hearings on the Commission’s proposals, and only once has 
Congress rejected an amendment proposed by the Commission.  Moreover, 
under the terms of the Sentencing Reform Act, the Commission need not even 
abide by these procedural requirements in issuing Policy Statements, since the 
statutory requirements of public notice and of congressional review apply only 
to formal “Guidelines.” 
The process by which amendments are made to the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure is far more exhaustive, and that process is more likely to 
be responsive to a variety of perspectives and concerns.  I will not go into the 
specifics of the Rules Enabling process here, except to note that it is multi-
step; nothing happens unless it is approved by several different groups.  And 
here too, Congress always has the final opportunity to review and revise. 
For the most part, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were written in 
the pre-Guidelines era.  With the notable exception of Rule 32, pertaining to 
the sentencing hearing itself, these Rules barely acknowledge the existence of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The Sentencing Commission, not the 
Judicial Conference, has played the leading role with respect to sentencing 
practice and procedure in the age of the Guidelines.  This is so despite the fact 
that, for the last fifty years, the Judicial Conference has insisted that the Rules 
Enabling process is the best way to address evidentiary and procedural issues 
in both civil and criminal litigation. 
As I have noted, the sentencing hearing itself is governed by a combination 
of Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Policy 
Statements in Chapter Six of the Sentencing Manual.  Pursuant to these 
requirements, the procedural protections afforded to a defendant at a 
sentencing hearing are not nearly as substantial as those available in other 
adjudicatory settings.  Most importantly, the rules of evidence do not apply, the 
standard of proof is “preponderance of the evidence,” and there is no right to 
confrontation of adverse witnesses. 
Some individual judges and other commentators—including, perhaps most 
notably, Chief Judge Edward Becker of the Third Circuit—have urged the 
implementation of greater procedural safeguards at the sentencing hearing.  
One proposal is that the standard of proof applied by the judge at sentencing 
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hearings under the Guidelines be raised from the low “preponderance” 
standard to a heightened standard such as “clear and convincing evidence,” 
perhaps even to the standard at criminal trials of “proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Another proposal is that certain of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
especially those relating to hearsay, be made applicable to sentencing hearings. 
Others have proposed that the Federal Rule governing plea hearings, Rule 
11, be amended to require the Government to file a notice of sentencing facts 
prior to the entry of a plea of guilty.  As Rule 11 is now written, it does not 
attempt to prescribe the information that has to be given to a defendant about 
the mandatory consequences flowing from the Guidelines.  (Indeed, district 
judges often—and understandably—tell defendants at a change of plea hearing 
that no one, at that point, knows with any certainty or confidence where the 
projected sentencing calculus will lead.)  It is not until after a defendant pleads 
guilty that he must be advised of the allegations against him regarding relevant 
conduct and other “real offense” factors that may dramatically increase the 
sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines.  Requiring notice of sentencing 
facts prior to the defendant’s plea of guilty would simply make mandatory 
what the Sentencing Commission has already “encouraged” in its 1993 
amendment to the Guidelines. 
The simple fact underlying all of these procedural proposals is this: the 
sentencing hearing has been transformed by the Guidelines into an 
adjudicatory proceeding, with fact-finding and application of law to the 
findings.  Yet the procedural rules are vestiges of the previous era of broad 
judicial discretion, and thus remain distinctly non-adjudicatory.  This 
inconsistency provides an incentive for prosecutors, in the words of a 
distinguished former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
to “indict for less serious offenses which are easy to prove and then expand 
them in the probation office.”  Prosecutors acting in good faith are tempted to 
take advantage of a lawful means of bypassing the requirements of indictment 
and trial found in the Constitution and in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and to seek punishment of a defendant under the less stringent 
adjudicatory requirements of a sentencing hearing. 
III.   ALLOW JUDGES TO ACCEPT SENTENCES AGREED UPON BY THE 
PARTIES 
My third and final proposal is a straightforward one: that judges should be 
given greater leeway in accepting plea bargains.  Specifically, I propose that 
the Sentencing Guidelines and/or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be 
amended to recognize explicitly the authority of the sentencing judge to 
impose a sentence in accordance with a plea agreement where the judge finds 
that the proposed sentence would achieve the purposes of criminal punishment 
at least as well as the sentence suggested by the Guidelines. 
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As has been noted by more than one observer of the federal sentencing 
system, the Guidelines have not acknowledged the extent to which the formal 
demands of law are inevitably tempered in implementation.  Until now, the 
Guidelines have ignored, or attempted to suppress, the adversarial bargaining 
that is virtually inherent in litigation.  Until now, the Guidelines have driven 
the process of adjustment underground and hidden from observers the 
decisions that actually shape a sentence. 
Most criminal cases in the federal courts, as in other courts of this country, 
end in explicit or implicit plea bargains—just as most civil cases are resolved 
by settlement.  Although over ninety percent of federal convictions are 
obtained by pleas of guilty, rather than by trial, the Guidelines do not clearly 
acknowledge the legitimacy of settlements based on the parties’ agreement on 
offense conduct and, in turn, a below-Guidelines sentencing range.  The result 
is that prosecutors and defense attorneys, though “officers of the court,” are 
sorely tempted to deny information to both the probation officer and the court 
that would fully reveal all arguably relevant aspects of the case. 
The current Guidelines also place judges in an ethically uncertain position.  
When an apparently Guidelines-evading plea agreement is brought to a judge, 
he or she has two options.  The judge might, on the one hand, accept the plea-
agreement and claim (“for the record”) to be applying the Sentencing 
Guidelines—even though the judge, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and 
the probation officer all know that, in fact, the judge is approving an agreement 
of the parties that has the effect of avoiding an otherwise-applicable Guidelines 
range.  Alternatively, the judge may ignore the agreement of the parties and 
impose the sentence called for by the Guidelines—not an attractive option 
when no one in the courtroom (including, quite possibly, the probation officer) 
believes that the presumptive Guidelines sentence is appropriate in the case at 
hand. 
Neither of these options is particularly attractive to a judge who is 
committed to the rule of law.  The Sentencing Commission’s effort to vest 
probation officers with autonomy from judges, and to direct their activities and 
responsibilities, has also led to tension and confusion among all the 
participants in sentencing. 
Much, though not all, of the dissimulation, distrust and discomfort 
generated by the Guidelines could be avoided if judges understood that they 
are authorized to accept a plea agreement that resolved matters differently from 
the resolution that would be mandated under the Sentencing Guidelines in the 
absence of the agreement.1  Recognition of the legitimacy of such plea 
 
 1. This clarification would require no congressional action.  The duties of the Sentencing 
Commission already include promulgation of general policy statements regarding the appropriate 
use of “the authority granted under rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
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agreements would also clarify the role of the probation officer.  Where adverse 
parties have arrived at an agreement (or partial agreement) that both they and 
the judge believe is appropriate and achieves the objectives of punishment 
specified by Congress (including, most importantly, those specified in the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984), we should defer to the judgment of the 
decision-makers who know the most about the case, rather than to the vagaries 
of sentencing rules constructed by persons who (by definition) know nothing 
about the case. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Sentencing Reform Act worked a revolution in federal sentencing.  
Since, by all appearances, this revolution is here to stay, it is time we moved 
from general opposition or defense of the Guidelines to more modest proposals 
for reform.  The three proposals I have made herein accept the Guidelines as a 
fact of life.  If implemented, however, these proposals would make sentencing 
under the Guidelines a fairer and more sensible process. 
 
accept or reject a plea agreement entered into pursuant to rule 11(e)(1).”  28 U.S.C. § 
994(a)(2)(E). 
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